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Article 8

date yourself. If you love, you want to give- you are tireles_s, lfless,
and generous. If you love, you really want to serve and not JUE work.
One does not spare oneself if one loves."
It has been said that a: ·distinctive feature of Christianity is ) proc·
lamation of the resurrection, of hope, and that this means u estab·
lishment of a genuine religion of salvation in the sense of rel e ~ ~ from
this world. But Dietrich Bonhoffer has called this attitude a d . gerous
mistake. Bonhoffer says that "Salvation from cares and nee , from
fears and longings, from sin and death into a better world be nd the
grave is not the distinctive picture of Christianity as proclaim . in the
gospels and St. Paul."
.
. .
·Christianity offers nothing to be seen but ordmary hfe m ' ordin·
ariness. Christian hope 13ends us back to our life on earth.
We can create hope for our patients regardless of the sta: .ics in a
particular disease. We have to learn how to dispense hope an encour·
age our patients to pray and to pray for them and with them Ve must
help them to find meaning and the possibilities in the situr on. The
American Psychiatric Association, in its 1984 meeting; had 1 impor·
tant seminar on "The Role of Hope in .Remission from I tess." It
showed that the patient's hop£!- and that of the health pre essionals
-has a relevance to the immune system of the patient.
Finally, in this healing ministry we share ourselves. \\ are that
presence of Christ for others. We choose life for ourselves 1d others
and thus witness to the healing ministry of the Church.
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Ginzberg recently described in the Journal the monetarization of
medical care. 1 Law follows money, and along with monetarization
have come new laws ·and legai regulations -constraints that cast a
lengthening shadow over the clinical practice of medicine. PSRO (professional standards review organization) , PRO (professional review
organization), DRG (diagnosis-related group), and CON (certificate of
need) are acronyms that have entered the physician 's consciousness along with malpractice liability, antitrust actions, and federal and state
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lative, and judicial reform is not just the Medical Establish~ en .rying
"wolf" again but an intelligible and realistic concern deserVIng : pub·
lie attention because there a.re important public consequences.
One should acknowledge at the outset that there is real cc · (usion
and perplexity among physicians because the import of k l con·
straints seems to be so contradictory. Much of the recent s ce and
aggrefederal regulation has been aimed at creating incentives to lo
3
dside"
gate health care costs. On the other hand.' the ':ju~ges at t~e
Saikewicz decision, 4 Baby Doe regulat10ns, JUdtcal dec1s1< s that
reat of
expand the reach of hospital liability, 5 and th_e ever-present
malpractice litigation, which is time-co_n~umm~ and thow " to be
professionally damaging, impel the phys1c1~ to 1~nore cost ' ::1 effec·
tiveness considerations. The legal constrrunts atmed at c trolling
expenditures suggest that the aggregate cost of ~ealth_ carf - to be
considered as an explicit factor in deciding what 1s eth1Call) J1d clinically appropriate treatment in particular cases. The othel ypes of
constraints suggest, explicitly in the case of the pr~po~e? tbY Doe
regulations and implicitly in . the threat. o~ malpractice htlg, on, that
cost cannot be either an ethiCally or chmcally relevant con. Jeration.
How does the responsible physician respond ·to these mixec: Pgal mes-

recent example. They appeal to the supporters of regulation because
they allow regulators to set the categories and fix the price tag of
hospital treatment. The supporters of competition are appeased by the
fact that at least DRGs provide an incentive for economic efficiency,
and more efficient hospitals will benefit financially from the fixed
. · .price. But it is probably safe to say that one ot her good reason politicians endorse DRGs as they did HMOs and PSROs is that all the
painful decisions inherent in balancing cost control and the quality of
health care are passed on from government officials t o health care
providers. Even where such measures seem to be effective in containing costs; these developments are changing the pract ice of m edicine,
diffusing ethical responsibility, challenging the physician's professional
identity and autonomy, and affecting the doctor-pat ient relationship.10 And if the time comes when patients are deprived of needed
services or suffer some negative consequence, it will be the providers
who will be held accountable for their decisions.
The standards of practice that may result from the response of
physicians to these legally imposed economic constraints and to incentives intended to lower the aggregate cost of health dire have yet to be
reconciled with the body of law that pushes physicians to ignore cost.
The most important practical consideration is malpractice litigation.
~~
.
.
~
Even when legal policy has been aimed solely at redu c .g or ceen
How will a jury respond when economic rather than medical considertaining aggregate health care costs, contradict~ry ~et~ods 1-J av~ b
ations are offered as the reason for a diagnostic or treatm~nt decision
applied with conflicting clinical and ethical tmphcatwm Baslcally,
~hat has led to a malpractice claim? The physician 's alleged negligence
15
legal e~perts in health policy disagree about whether cosL ar~ bette~
measured in court against the professional standard of care - an
contained by command and control regulation or by dereg"Jlatwn a~
atnbiguous concept based on expert medical testimony . But lawyers
competition.s The former legal approach to health polic ·: tr~ats t e
:;: that the current professional standard is different and higher
health care system as an industry to be regulated, imposing fiVe-year
a standard of care responsive to economic constraints.
lans hospital rate setting, price fixing, CON, and other control!~ odn
It
is clear that the physician is now at risk of being found liable for
P
' . expansion. The latter approac h. f avors an en d t o centra
lZe
~alpractice if any negative consequences occur as a result of deviacapital
.
d
'al .
ty an a
tio f
·
control believing that competition, entrepreneur! mgen Ul • d'1 _
~s rom the professional standard of care, undertaken to meet econ7
free m~ket will lower costs and enhance efficiency . These. c~ntr~ ~
om~c. constraints and incentives created by new cost-controlling legal
tory politicoeconomic philosophies translated into co nfhcttng e~t
Pohc1es. It is difficult to measure the actual importance of this new malolicies have attracted different political constituencies. As a res~ ~
:ctice li~bility, but there can be no question that the doctor's legal
P.
.
.
t
ompromlS
d emma 1s real. And the legal dilemma mirrors in many ways the
legislation affecting health care 1s sometimes a s range c . legisoctor's ethical dilemmas.
between contradictory legal approaches. Federal health-planmng Jan·
lation exemplifies such provlSlons. Federal gut'de1·mes as k state
. Pbut
ning agenCies to consolidate · and regionalize health care se~vlCes,t·on
d mnova 1
·t ·
Ethical Implications
the agencies are also asked to promote compet 1 wn an
ol·
ls of cons
.
t
among health care providers. How these contrad 1c ory goa . .
om·
· unc 1ear . 7 Cnttca1 cle of
ap A~though many physicians have· welcomed the · " committee
idation and competition are to be reconc1-1ed 1s
ce Proach" to ethical problems, some have become increasingly conmentary on planning for obstetrical services offers a good examP
9
Thrned about their personal ethical responsibilities to their patients.
the irreconcilable conflicts.
.
1 implicaCOs~ ethical ~uestions attendant on rationing health care to control
Perhaps even more important in their clinical _and ethtc~
f the
·
-· ·
b th stdes o
quest~Uch duectly on physicians' personal responsibilities, and such
tions are legal constraints acceptable to po1ttlctans on o
h rnost
Ions have frequently been discussed in this journal and elsestruggle between regulation and competition. DRGs are t e
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where. 11 • 12 Many prominent physicians seem to feel that t h ·e is a
need to draw firm ethical lines against these threatening legt intru·
sions. Even highly interventionist courts have expressed a w il 1gness
to consider medical ethics in their decision making. 13 But' a there
principles in medical ethics that are sufficiently clear to pern us or
the lawmakers to draw sharp lines? Much has been written in le past
three decades about medical ethics, but has this spate of scl larship
produced any real or compelling consensus among practicir · physi· I
cians? It seems that although awareness of ethical · issues ! .s been
increased and committees have proliferated, the lack of con nsus is
now even more obvious. Perhaps the most important area ~ ethical
confusion is the care of the aged, in which DRG regulation h begun.
The author of a recent article in the Journal denounced d ; rimina·
tion against the elderly as · an emerging and dubious resuJ · )f cost·
benefit analysis for the control of health care costs. 14 T
views
d only
expressed were in sharp contrast to those in a paper publi
weeks before, in · which the author argued that it i$ ethil 1, under
appropriate circumstances, to provide resuscitation and in t~ :;ive care
"sparingly" to "pleasantly senile" patients, Although the thi : t of the
latter article was patient autonomy and death with dignity, st saving
and cost-benefit analysis hovered iJ1 the background as legit "tate ethi·
cal considerations: "as society tries to contain the soar1 ·.; cost of
health care, the physician is subject to insistent demand~ fo restraint,
which cannot be ignored. 15 These contrasting papers are in icative of
the medical profession's current confusion and un.cert m ,t y about
where we stand on our own ethical prinicples when confr· nted with
demands to reduce the aggregate cost of health care. The 1~ vi A's Prin·
ciples of Medical Ethics, as currently formulated, certainly ,2;ive few , if
any, firm practical guidelines on this issue. They seem int<·nded more
to pacify the Federal Trade Commission and others who h<L ~ attacked
our "protectionistic ethics" than to instruct the pract itnn er. Even
"primum non nocere" is absent from the AMA's principles.
Is medical ethics a myth, is it a reflection of law and contemporarY
. values pronounced in solemn tones, or does it have bite drawn from
professional values and centuries of tradition? Consider this question
in the light of the recent Baby Doe controversy. The J u stice Depart·
ment's legal theory of discrimination against the handicapped£
whether right or wrong, wa5 a principled position- that the qualitY 0
future life is not an appropriate consideration in withholding treat·
ment from a newborn.16 The American Academy of Ped iatrics, sp~ak;
ing for a divided profession, did not offer a different principled ethi?a
response in contesting the promulgated regulations. The alternative
that the academy presented was decision making by local co mmittee.
It suggested nQ countervailing ethical guidelin~s with respect to the
relevancy of the future quality of life. The only principle involved
local committee control rather than national legal con t rol. And t e ·
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proposed composition of the local committee seemed geared to the
accommodation of interest groups rather than to the facilitation of decisions made on the basis of ethical medical principles.
Nothing I have said is meant to suggest that particular medical
ethicists or particular practitioners do not have principled responses to
important ethical questions. The claim is rather that whether or not
they do, there is no longer even the appearance of an effective consensus in the medical profession and, further, that our professional
code of ethics lacks a coherent, stable, and principled foundation.
Veatch has suggested that we "abandon the idea that an ethic for
medicine can be based on a professionally articulated code." 17 Some
medical ethicists have gone even further and have argued that the
attempt to supplant a professional code and to apply other a priori
ethical principles to particular cases has failed. 18. 19 The correct ethical conduct of the practitioner is too bound up, they suggest, with the
particular context of the particular case. This argument appeals to
. many physicians, but it is an argument that cuts two ways. It does not
suggest . that the physician need not worry about governing ethical
theories and that rigid legal or ethical rules must bend to particularistic clinical judgments. But it also makes the problem of relying on
ethical principles in order to resist legal regulation all the more difficult ~ What is the ethical principle that will send physicians to the
barricades to resist legal reform aimed at lowering the aggregate cost
of health care?
poli~ical

Cost Saving and Practical Ethics
Even without a guiding set of professional ethical principles, most
physicians are highly ethical in their practice. Their practical ethics are
bas~d on two familiar maxims : "do what you think will benefit the
patient" and "primum non riocere," or first of all, do no harm . Veatch
~tes that the "conveyors of these traditions often do not realize that
t es~ ~raditional slogans are potentially in conflict." 20 Yet, every
~hyslcian who has cared for a dying patient has faced both the ques!on of h~w much more to do and the problem of determining when
beneftt becomes the iatrogenic harm of prolonging futile suffering.
th ese. max~ms may not constitute a theory of ethics, but they provide
tie dialectical framework within which the physician actually pracces and judges the practice of other physicians .
. b ~hysi~i~s learned how to proceed within this framework primarily
Y denbfymg at the start of their careers with role models. These role
~dels were typically physicians who practiced in teaching hospitals.
e best were conscientious and compassionate physicians who dem~nst~ated a dedication to high-quality care, who in their quest for
xce lence practiced at the frontiers of medical knowledge, and who
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pressed for certainty of diagnosis and every possible benefit of t ·atment even at what is now described as the flattening end of the < ve.
. Their ethical practice and their quest for professional excellence ere
combined, not separate, virtues. If the art of practical medical et1 ·s is
finding the proper balance between doing everything that may b efit
the patient and doing no harm, then it may well be true t
we
identified with role models who erred on the side of doing too .1ch.
But the quest for excellence is a value that cannot easily : · dismissed in the education of future physicians -nor should it b· The
wish to practice at the frontiers of medical knowledge and to e 1and
those frontiers is an equally important value in medical edu · j on.
Tho~e valu~s may have skewed the balance of the art of p r tical
medtcal ethiCs, but they are values that have made American m Jcine
their
preeminent and have made American physicians deserving
patients' trust. It is those values that are threatened by both gulaand
tory constraints and the emphasis on entrepreneurial ingen u
competitive efficiency.
·
·
Havighurst, one of the leading legal proponents of market r c rm in
health care, has specifically attacked the "tyranny of prof ;ional
norms and standards" as the basic obstacle to such reform :· Even
· · Fuchs, an economist sympathetic to the "caring physician '
orries
that physicians are counterproductively "imprinted" with 't ~ " best
medical practice" in medical school.22 But what these w• -inten·
tioned critics who are concerned about the aggregate cost c health
care fail to appreciate is the ethical void created when medical ·ractice
is viewed through the prism of cost-benefit analysis. For ~hen che law
attempts to control aggregate costs, either through regulat i· 1 or by
promoting competition, it creates a potential conflict of mterest
between patient and physician.
Critics of medical paternalism and the traditional maxir.:·; I have
described argue that physicians have ignored the importar:, e of the ·
patient's autonomy and rights. Informed consent is the focus of
attempts by ethical and legal reformers to remedy medical aternal·
ism. Certainly, the patient has a right to know not only t h" risks and
benefits of alternative treatments but also when cost-benefit analysis
plays a part in the doctor's recommendations. But why should a sick
and anxious patient accept the doctor's economic calculation? What is
the patient;s interest in reduCing the economic risk to t he doctor or
the aggregate cost of health care by foregoing a bed in the coronarY
care unit or a CAT scan? It is one thing to entrust your life and health
at times of crisis to a physician who is committed to the practical
ethics that involves a quest for excellence and who may err on the side
of doing too much. It is quite another to entrust your life an d health
~t times of crisis to a physician whose diagnostic and t herapeutic
mterventions are limited by new regulatory constraints ·or incentives
of competitive efficiency that "place the provider at economic risk. "

c

If the "provider" does not make the patient aware of the implications
of that economic risk, then medical paternalism will inevitably take on
a different and even more damning kind of odium. And if it is ethi·
cally wrong to conceal these new economic incentives and the medical
profession's responses to them, to reveal them may threaten the trust
and confidence of patients even in "caring physicians." "Caveat
emptor" will be more relevant than "primum non nocere" in doctorpatient relationships.
It is for these reasons that the current concern among practitioners
' is intelligible, realistic, and deserving of public attention. The traditional .maxims and p·r actical medical ethics have been undermined, the
values that have made American medical education strong have been
challenged, the legal liabilities of the physician have increased, and the
doctor and patient now confront an economic conflict of interests
that will not easily be resolved.
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